Smart phone users
in the Ethiopian capital are rejoicing. After a two-month blackout the
Ethiopian government has permitted the return of mobile data.
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| Mobile Internet in Ethiopia |
Most Ethiopians who
access the Internet do so through their phones, and previously the
government had singled out social media activity as a major influence in
agitating unrest that has doggedly seethed across the country since
breaking out a year ago.
"They've broken
promise after promise, so people won't believe them--that's the
problem." --Merera Gudina, Chair of the opposition Oromo Federalist
Congress Party
But now, more than
two months into the six-month state of emergency declared by the
government on Oct. 9, protests previously rocking the country's two most
populous regions appear to have subsided, and gangs of young men are no
longer prowling the country setting fire to buildings, blocking roads
and clashing with security forces.
But despite the appearance of order being restored, no one seems to know what may happen next, or whether this calm will hold.
The current
situation may simply serve as a temporary break in Ethiopia's most
sustained and widespread period of dissent and protests since the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ruling party
came to power following the 1991 revolution.
"The protests have
shaken the EPRDF regime in ways not seen in more than two decades and a
half," says Mohammed Ademo, an Ethiopian journalist in Washington, D.C.,
and working alongside diaspora activists following events. "It did more
to challenge the regime's grip on power in one year than what some
opposition groups have done in years."
For up until now,
the political gamble underpinning the EPRDF's developmental state
project--similar to China's strategy--has been that the material
transformation of Ethiopia would ultimately satisfy the divergent
populations comprising Ethiopia's ethnic federation.
With months of the
state of emergency still to run, however, the EPRDF now has a critical
opportunity to forge a sustainable route out of the mire. The big
question is whether it will seize the opportunity or is capable of doing
so.
Because since 1991,
dogged by criticism over its authoritarian style and human rights
record with Western observers and governments calling on it to deepen
its commitment to democratic reforms, it hasn't shown much interest in
listening.
"If you look at our
history, the present system is the best in terms of development," says
Abebe Hailu, an Addis Ababa-based human rights lawyer who lived through
the 1974 downfall of Emperor Haile Selassie and the ensuing military
dictatorship that eventually fell in 1991 to the EPRDF's founders. "But
there's still a lot to do when it comes to developing democracy."
Protests that began
last November with Oromo farmers objecting to land grabs have
mushroomed into an anti-government movement which now includes the
Amhara, Ethiopia's second largest ethnic group after the Oromo (together
the two groups represent about 60 percent of the population).
And protests have
occurred in places transformed by economic growth, such as the Amhara
capital, Bahir Dar, and Adama, Oromia's most cosmopolitan city.
Meanwhile, the rhetoric of ethnic hatred and cleansing has already shown
itself.
This all
illustrates that despite the EPRDF's efforts to forge a new nation-state
identity bolstered by economic transformation, ethno-regional loyalties
have lost none of their appeal; especially in the face of government
oppression identified with a Tigrayan elite--from an ethnic group
forming only 6 percent of the population--accused of usurping power and
much of that new wealth.
"The constitution
the government came up with is a perfect match for a country like
Ethiopia," says one Addis Ababa resident, explaining how this ethnic
federalism best matches Ethiopia's diversity--he himself is of mixed
ethnic heritage. "But you have a group of Tigrayans in government
deciding the fate of 100 million people who aren't allowed to say
anything," The result, he adds, is the constitution is shown to be only
as good as the paper it is written on.
Against such a
background, these protests have illustrated that the perennial problem
for Ethiopia's rulers over the centuries remains unsolved: maintain the
integrity of a country and people whose boundaries are those of a
multi-ethnic former empire forged by violent conquest of subjugated
peoples (such as the Oromo).
Admittedly until
recently, and for most of the last two decades, it appeared the EPRDF
was on top of this challenge, demonstrating the most impressive economic
and development-driven track record of any Ethiopian government in
modern history.
Against the fiasco
of international assistance in Somalia, Ethiopia is a development
darling, held up as a heartening example of indigenous government and
international partners succeeding in reducing the likes of poverty and
mortality rates.
Geopolitical
considerations also mean Ethiopia is an important peace and security
bulwark for the West in the Horn of Africa, a region troubled by
internecine fighting in South Sudan, Islamic insurgents in Somalia and
floods of refugees abandoning Eritrea.
But statistics that
wowed the international community have masked the more complex reality
in which most Ethiopians, while not as susceptible to famine and
disease, remain utterly stifled in their lives' endeavors.
"Usually protests
start in towns where you have the politically active but this has been a
popular revolution at the grassroots in rural areas in Amhara and
Oromia," says Yilikal Getenet, chairman of the opposition Blue Party.
"People are dying and people are protesting about clear [issues]."
During its rule the
EPRDF has shunned diversity of political opinion, repeatedly cracking
down on opposition parties, putting their politicians in jail of forcing
them into exile. The 2015 election produced a parliament without a
single opposition representative. Freedom of expression in Ethiopia is
strictly curtailed--an independent civil society no longer exists.
Meanwhile,
Ethiopia's citizenry is increasingly angry at seemingly never-ending
government corruption. And a mushrooming youthful population means the
number of young unemployed men across the country irrevocably rises,
their thoughts and frustrations turning toward the center of power that
is Addis Ababa.
Numbers killed during protests range upward of 600, with thousands imprisoned, according to rights and opposition groups.
"We now have names,
and in most cases even photos, of the more than 1,000 victims who were
killed by security forces since the protests began," Mohammed says.
Having built a
brand over the last 25 years as the safest and most reliable country in
the volatile Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has found its reputation on the
line amid the upheaval. Now it's trying to repair the damage to that
brand and to society itself.
"The government must be ready to accept fundamental reforms," Abebe says.
Prime Minister
Hailemariam Desalegn conducted a major cabinet reshuffle at the end of
October, changing 21 of 30 ministerial posts, including 15 new
appointees.
The selection of
technocrats without party affiliation is a positive signal the party is
serious about delivering changes, say some, while others argue it
perpetuates the monopoly rule of a select few, an intelligentsia judged
worthy to lead the perceived ignorant Ethiopian masses.
The government is
also promising "deep reforms" to solve root causes of protests. But for a
country with a millennia of centralized, autocratic rule, that's much
easier said than done.
A prevailing
accusation among its opponents is the EPRDF still clings to the same
left-wing revolutionary ideology of 1991 that insists on Leninist
single-party control, hence it remains fundamentally anti-democratic and
unable to countenance reform.
Others claim moderates exist in the party who could help change its direction for the better. But that's a tough sell.
"This government is
the most isolated government from the Ethiopian people," says Merera
Gudina, Chairman of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress Party, who
was arrested at the beginning of December for allegedly flouting state
of emergency laws. "They've broken promise after promise, so people
won't believe them--that's the problem."
Hence many argue
the EPRDF has lost all legitimacy and must make way for a transitional
government. Others counter that's neither feasible nor in Ethiopia's
best interests.
"People need to recognize that if you push too fast you can get more chaos," Abebe says.
Instead, according
to many, the EPRDF should focus on the following: purge its ranks of the
corrupt and ineffective; reform key public institutions found wanting;
release political prisoners; take seriously negotiations with opposition
elements home and abroad; ensure Ethiopia's youth are given jobs and
hope.
Also, at the same
time, the government must establish a new electoral commission to
guarantee the next local elections in 2018 and national elections in
2020 are freely contested.
"If we don't
achieve free and fair elections then, this country will be in serious
danger--that is the last chance we have--really," Lidetu said. "But we
also can't wait until those elections: so starting from now we have to
have dialogue between the different political groups in an open manner."
